主题：

How does the Market for Corporate Control Impact Tax Avoidance?Evidence from International M&A Laws

时间：2020年12月10日（周四）上午9：30

地点：新澳门游戏网站入口楼301

参加对象：要求会计学硕一年级研究生参加，欢迎其他师生参加。

摘要：

Income taxes are a major expense for profitable corporations, oftentimes 25 percent or more of  pretax income. This study exploits a setting – the market for corporate control – to test competing  agency-based and risk-based explanations of corporate tax planning. Exploiting the staggered  enactment of M&A laws across countries that increased the threat of takeover as an exogenous  shock that allows a powerful difference-in-differences design, we find a significant reduction in  tax avoidance following the takeover law passage. Our analysis suggests that reduced management  private benefits consumption (i.e., rent extraction), rather than managerial effort aversion or increased risk concerns associated with aggressive tax strategies, is the likely mechanism through  which takeover laws impact tax avoidance. Collectively,our findings extend the literature by  highlighting the role of the corporate control market in shaping cross-sectional variation in  corporate tax avoidance.

主讲人简介：

胡金帅，厦门大学财务管理与会计研究院副院长，QTEM国际硕士联盟事务院长，会计学副教授，博导，加州大学尔湾分校高级访问学者，入选财政部2020年度国际化高端会计人才。获厦门大学会计学硕士、香港浸会大学会计学博士学位。研究领域包括中国及国际资本市场会计研究、财务会计、财务报告、公司治理等。主持参与多项国家省部级课题和国家自科重大课题。近年来有8篇论文在会计、财务领域国际著名刊物发表或接受发表，包括JAE、JCF、JIAR等。